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Abstract: The growing importance of shared networks, shared platforms and shared standards leads to a 
renewed discussion of the essential facilities doctrine of antitrust. This is an area where European law and 
American law have diverged. In Trinko (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court came close to abolishing it. At 
the same time, it was reinvigorated by the European Commission, which asserted it successfully in E.C. v. 
Microsoft, and then, facing criticism, clarified the doctrine in a Guidance document.  
We harmonize the main cases around the doctrine’s original but often forgotten purpose namely, 
harvesting economic synergies through sharing. We argue that, absent such a doctrine, these synergies 
could be lost as firms either avoid sharing to avoid antitrust liability, or create sharing arrangements that 
undermine competition. We show how and why the original purpose of the doctrine has become 
entangled with other antitrust issues, in particular, leveraging. We systematize the sharing rules that have 
been imposed or allowed, with an emphasis on how to harvest synergies while mitigating any harm to 
competition. 
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I. Introduction1 
The essential facilities doctrine is famously disreputable.  Many scholars make no bones about 
wanting to abolish it.2 In the meantime, they seek to restrict it with a forest of “limiting 
principles.”3 More fundamentally, they deny that it is a theory at all but an “epithet”4 or 
“catchphrase” for fact patterns whose “contours” are “unclear.”5  Indeed, even its friends 
concede that it is “undertheorized,” “unarticulated,”6 or no more than a “useful label.”7 Since the 
1990s this judgment has become self-fulfilling.  Instead of trying to clarify the doctrine, today’s 
trial8 and appellate9 judges go out of their way to decide cases on other grounds. In 2004, the 
                                                            
1 Prof. Scotchmer passed away following a brief illness in January 2014. The current text is presented as 
she left it for the last time on October 20, 2013. Obvious typographical and citation errors have been 
corrected in the interests of readability. – smm. 
 
2 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (West 2011) at 
336 (“The so-called ‘essential facility’ doctrine is one of the most troublesome, incoherent, and 
unmanageable bases for Sherman § 2 liability. The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better 
place if it were jettisoned, with a little fine tuning of the general doctrine of refusal to deal to fill any 
gaps.”) 
 
3 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice IIIB (2d ed. 
1999) at 196-97 (“we take the more constrained route of seeking to limit the doctrine’s scope so as to 
make it as consistent as possible with the general goals of antitrust, which are to permit firms to enter and 
operate in markets.”)  
 
4  Philip J. Areeda, “Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,” 58 Antitrust L.J.  841 
(1989);  Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice IIIB at 
196 (2d ed. 1999) at 199 (“The ‘essential facility’ is just an epithet describing the monopolist’s situation: 
the monopolist possesses something that the plaintiff wants. It is not an independent tool of analysis; it is 
only a label – a label that beguiles some commentators and courts into pronouncing a duty to deal without 
analyzing the implications already considered at length in this chapter.”)  
 
5 Sergio Baches Opi, “The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property 
Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still 
Sacrosanct?” 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. L.J. 409-507 (2001) at 419-20. 
 
6 Marina Lao, “Networks, Access, and Essential Facilities: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft,” 62 
S.M.U. L. Rev. 557-595 (2009), at 558. 
7 Opi supra at 419-20. 
 
8 Spencer Weber Waller, “Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities,” 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 359-386 (2008), 
at 363. 
 
9 Waller, supra, at 369-370 (noting that appeals courts “almost always” affirm lower court decisions on 
different grounds so that the doctrine becomes a “make-weight.”) 
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Supreme Court’s Trinko10 opinion strongly hinted that the doctrine had at the very least reached 
its “outer limits” and might not exist at all. 11 
These reactions are understandable. First, it is an antitrust doctrine that demands cooperation 
among rivals. This seems at odds with Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in which many forms of 
“cooperation” are condemned. Instead of being suspicious of cooperation, the essential facilities 
doctrine demands it. How can these two bodies of law coexist? Second, many of the cases are 
brought and decided under Section 2 as refusal-to-deal cases, which has led scholars to ask 
whether an additional doctrine is necessary.12 
Third, the doctrine’s core cases span a bewildering array of facts and legal contexts. Some 
involve cooperative associations that span hundreds of parties; others just two. Some talk 
narrowly of feasible relief; others of a duty to share. It is tempting to avoid this chaos by getting 
rid of the doctrine entirely. 
Reforms since the 1970s have almost always proceeded as negative definitions, that is, defining 
what the doctrine is not. Initially, these refinements took the form of new proof requirements or 
“elements.” They accelerated after Prof. Areeda’s celebrated call for “limiting principles” in 
1989. New refinements continue to appear in court cases and influential treatises. 
The negative definitions have been wildly successful in choking off litigation. However, they do 
almost nothing to explain why a duty to share should exist or when to enforce it. This article 
breaks with recent tradition by trying to formulate a coherent doctrine rooted in the cases, and 
exploring the consequences of this doctrine for competition and consumer welfare.  
 
We argue that most of the principal cases follow an important common thread that is beautifully 
anticipated in Terminal Railroad 13 even though the doctrine has wandered in other directions. 
The lost message is that antitrust interventions must not discard beneficial synergies that require 
sharing. This common thread goes a long distance to unifying the cases on both sides of the 
Atlantic. We anticipate that the doctrine will gain renewed importance, since the digital economy 
is a new source of synergies. For example, there is a natural synergy in aggregating information 
                                                            
10 Verizon Comms., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 
11 But see Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty 
and Rivalry in Innovation (Oxford 2012) at 316 (saying that Trinko can be read narrowly so that it is 
limited to the proposition that antitrust law should not be used as an “overlay” to compel sharing when 
“regulators are already managing, and apparently quite well.”)  
 
12 See, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its 
Practice IIIB (2d ed. 1999) , §7.7, at 305. 
 
13 Terminal Railroad Co. v. US, 224 US 383 (1912).  
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among firms that collect it, such as internet search firms, advertising platforms, and online 
vendors.14 Economic evidence of these synergies is already emerging.15 
 
The problem, as the Trinko court reminds us, is that sharing must be principled. One hundred 
years ago, Terminal Railroad claimed that in at least some cases, judges can implement sharing 
rules that simultaneously protect competition and preserve synergies. In what follows, we 
investigate how well this promise has been realized, and reformulate the doctrine in line with its 
original purpose. 
 
We are motivated in large part by observing that with respect to the essential facilities doctrine, 
American and European competition laws are diverging. The Supreme Court discredited the 
doctrine in the U.S. by refusing to assert it in Trinko (2004), and by loudly noting that the Court 
had never acknowledged such a doctrine. However, a few years later the European Commission 
gave it new life by asserting it successfully in E.C. v. Microsoft (2008).16 Because Microsoft 
(2008) was criticized as unprincipled, the European Commission then published a Guidance to 
explain how they will enforce the doctrine.17 That breathed even more life into it. 
 
The heart of the essential facilities doctrine is that sharing may create synergies that either 
enhance consumer value or reduce costs, and therefore help consumers.  But when, exactly, do 
such synergies exist? How can they be harvested without damaging competition so badly that 
consumers are worse off than without sharing?  
 
                                                            
14 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice IIIB (2d 
ed. 1999) at 309 (stressing that networks cannot exist without “a great deal of cooperation” between rival 
firms ) and Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty 
and Rivalry in Innovation (Oxford 2012) at 306 (“cooperation is necessary for the network’s continued 
efficient operation”). Also Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its 
Practice (West 2011) at 340  (“Applying the term ‘essential facility’ to such networks is not essential to 
the theory, but it is not inappropriate either.”). 
 
15 See, for example, Erik Brynjolfsson, Michael D. Smith, and Yu (Jeffrey) Hu, "Consumer 
Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online 
Bookstores", Management Science 49(11), November 2003, at p. 1580 ("Our analysis indicates that 
increased product variety of online bookstores enhanced consumer welfare by $731 million to $1.03 
billion in the year 2000, which is at least five times as large as the consumer welfare gain from increased 
competition and lower prices in the market.") 
 
16 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, EC Commission v. Microsoft. 
 
17 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, Official Journal C 045, 24/02/2009 P. 0007 – 
0020. 
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We proceed as follows. Section II reviews the best-known essential facilities decisions, stressing 
the practical judgments that led judges to conclude that sharing would produce net synergies and, 
inferentially, was being resisted for improper reasons. Section III reviews European Community 
law emphasizing how recent decisions have reinvigorated the doctrine, particularly in intellectual 
property cases. Section IV proposes elements of a rationalized doctrine. Section V categorizes 
the cases according to the sharing rules that were imposed, and explains their competitive effects. 
Section VI addresses some questions that critics are sure to raise. 
II. A Short Review of U.S. Cases 
 
In this section we remind readers of the salient features of the key cases, especially the 
sometimes forgotten synergies that make sharing attractive, as well as other reasons that courts 
have ordered sharing.  
We use these cases to stress two important problems that courts either did or should have 
addressed when trying to harvest synergies. First, sharing should be structured in a way that 
limits the exercise of market power. Second, assuming that the price is controlled, sharing should 
be nondiscriminatory. This maximizes the value of synergies, at least in most cases, and also 
ensures that power over the shared facility cannot be leveraged into an adjacent market.  
Terminal Railroad marked the first bold attempt to find sharing rules that achieve the synergies 
of joint operations while avoiding cartelization. The problem concerned relatively simple assets, 
two bridges and a ferry, for which the capacity needed to be managed jointly for the benefit of all 
the railroads. Successive cases over the 20th Century considered different kinds of synergies, and 
gradually extended sharing rules to complex businesses (newspaper advertising, ski slopes), 
regulated utilities (telephones, power lines), and intellectual property. The bridges and ferry in 
Terminal Railroad had been operated separately prior to the merger that resulted in litigation. 
However, as the century progressed, compelled sharing was extended to assets that had never 
been owned separately. In this section we detail the economic logic that led judges to accept and 
eventually become disillusioned with these successive expansions.  
In Terminal Railroad, a St. Louis railroad cartel had acquired the two bridges and ferry, which 
were the only facilities for transporting railroad trains across the Mississippi river. 18 While it 
was physically possible to build a fourth facility, the cost to any one company would have been 
                                                            
18 Id. at 391 - 92, 396. 
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“prohibitive.”19 The Court found that the arrangement violated both Section 1 and Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act.20  
Given that the Court had decided the Standard Oil case the previous year, the remedy should 
have been obvious: divestiture.21  Divestiture would have restored the status quo ante, in which 
all three facilities had operated independently.22 Despite this, the Court hesitated. Relying on 
Albert Perkins, a government-appointed railroad expert, it explained that “the terminals of 
Railroad lines in any large city should be unified as far as possible, and that such unification may 
be of the greatest public utility and of immeasurable advantage to commerce, state and 
interstate.” These synergies would necessarily be lost if the facilities were operated 
independently.23 The Court was seemingly faced with a cruel choice: Leave defendants’ market 
power intact or sacrifice important synergies. Either would make society poorer.  
But Perkins asserted a beguiling way out:  Open the facility to all railroads on the condition “that 
every railroad using the service should be a joint owner and equally interested in the control and 
management. This, he thinks, will serve the greatest possible economy, and will give the most 
efficient service without discrimination.”24 According to Perkins, “the facilities would belong to 
each relatively to its own business” so that “The charge for the haul thus lengthened would then 
be properly absorbed by the through rate, leaving nothing to be added to that to be charged the 
shipper or consignee but switching and storage charges proper.”25 
                                                            
19 Id. at 397. 
 
20 Id. at 392 (“When a combination prohibits “any other reasonable means” of entering the market both 
Section 1 and Section 2 are violated.”)  
 
21 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).  
 
22 Id. at 391, 399. 
 
23 Id. at 405. See also id. at 409 (“If, as we have already said, the combination of two or more mere 
terminal companies into a single system does not violate the prohibition of the statute against contracts 
and combinations in restraint of interstate commerce, it is because such a combination may be of the 
greatest public utility.”). The Court noted that separate ownership of facilities had promoted competition 
but also resulted “in some cases in an unnecessary duplication of facilities.” Id. at 393. 
 
24 Id. at 406. Seven decades later, Prof. Areeda endorsed Perkins’ argument by remarking that the 
“Supreme Court wisely concluded that the most efficient remedy was to admit nonmember companies to 
the consortium.”  
 
25 Id. at 406. 
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Whatever defendants may actually have thought, they found it hard to disagree. On the one hand, 
they already practiced such an arrangement among themselves.26 On the other, they had told the 
Court that they were prepared to open the facility “upon paying the same charges paid by the 
proprietary companies.”27 Ordering them to share would take them at their word.28 Furthermore, 
the Court would not insist: If the parties failed to come to an acceptable agreement, the court 
would simply follow Standard Oil by ordering “complete disjoinder of the three systems.”29 
Was the Court right to believe Perkins when he said that his remedy was “equally adequate” to 
divestiture?30 The key condition seemed to be that access prices would “produce no more 
revenue than shall equal the [facility’s] fixed charges, operating and maintenance expenses.”31 
This condition was enforced by the fact that “No dividends have ever been paid, and the 
company disclaims any purpose to pay dividends.”32 Apparently the facility would operate as a 
nonprofit company. 
Unfortunately, the Court said little about why, or in what sense, the conditions they accepted 
would lead to competitive pricing. The parties were ordered to amend the facility’s charter so 
that new railroads could become members “upon such just and reasonable terms as shall place 
such applying company upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits and burdens with the 
present proprietary companies.” Alternatively, railroads that did not wish to become owners 
would be allowed to use the facility “upon such just and reasonable terms and regulations as will, 
in respect of use, character and cost of service, place every such company upon as nearly an 
equal plane as may be with respect to expenses and charges as that occupied by the proprietary 
companies.”33 The Court asserted that this arrangement would be “plainly” lawful because the 
                                                            
26 Id. at 400 (“That other companies are permitted to use the facilities of the Terminal Company upon 
paying the same charges paid by the proprietary companies seems to be conceded.”) 
 
27 Id .at 400. The Court noted that such openness was not required by the operating company’s charter. 
 
28 Id. at 411 Court ordered the parties to reach an agreement providing for the admission of new owners 
on “just and reasonable terms” and providing also “definitely for the use of the terminal facilities by any 
other railroad not electing to become a joint owner.” 
 
29 Id. at 412. 
 
30 Id. at 409. 
 
31 Id. at 400.  
 
32 Id. at 401. The Court worried that this restriction could be evaded, since there appeared to be no formal 
restriction on paying dividends in the future and/or that the members could realize an “indirect profit 
through ownership of obligations of the absorbed companies.”  
33 Id. at 411. 
 
8 
 
facility would be “the impartial agent” and “bona fide agent and servant of every railroad line 
which shall use its facilities.34 The Court stressed the nondiscriminatory aspect of the 
arrangement, as we explain in Section V. The nonprofit aspect was also key, although the Court 
did not stress this. Nondiscriminatory prices without the nonprofit condition could be even 
higher than prices in a market where the firms were competing but not sharing facilities.  
Critics of the essential facilities doctrine have worked hard to distinguish Terminal Railroad on 
the ground that the Court would have reached the same result following an ordinary horizontal 
monopolies analysis and/or as a novel alternative to divestiture relief. 35 However, the Court’s 
emphasis on synergies requires a different analysis. Far from condemning sharing, the Court 
praised it as offering “the greatest public utility.” Illegality under “both the first and second 
sections” of the Sherman Act only entered the picture when the parties attempted to restrict 
sharing to “less than all of the companies” that needed the facility.36 However, as we will spell 
out in Section V, it is the nonprofit feature that allows sharing without the high prices that a 
cartel would typically support. 
Associated Press was brought under both sections of the Sherman Act, but summary judgment 
was granted under Section 1.37 Similarly to Terminal Railroad, AP members contributed fees38 
that “contemplate[d] no profit to AP”39 and received AP stories in return. The cost was 
                                                            
34 Id. at 410-411.  
 
35 Areeda, supra (arguing “most Supreme Court … can be explained without reference to it); David 
Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple 
Horizontal Monopoly?” 33 J.L. & Econ. 419 (1990) (arguing that Terminal Railroad is indistinguishable 
from an ordinary cartel case). 
 
36 Id. at 409. The Court added that would-be competitors might normally be required to build their own 
facility but lacked “reasonable means to do so. Id.  This was based on defendants’ admission that the 
unique “geographical and topographical situation” in St. Louis made “the cost to any one company … 
prohibitive." Id. at 397. 
 
37 Justice Douglas noted that an exclusive news sharing arrangement between newspapers potentially 
violated both Section 1 and Section 2. Id. 24. 
 
38 Id. at 9. Members also contributed news stories to AP. They were not allowed to sell their news to any 
other agency or publisher. Id.  
 
39 Id. at 10. See also United States v. AP, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (“AP is not a profit-making 
company, but strictly co-operative, paying its expenses by assessments levied upon its members, and 
never declaring any dividends, although it has accumulated large assets.”) 
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distributed among member newspapers in proportion to the populations of the regions they 
served, regardless of actual circulation.40 
The synergy in this arrangement was, if anything, even starker than in Terminal Railroad. Each 
new member shared the costs of newsgathering without degrading the resource. The potential 
synergies were limitless. It would have been economically efficient for every newspaper in the 
country, including rivals, to join the AP. In contrast, railroad bridges eventually become 
congested. 
There were also important differences in how the shared facilities were organized. First, the 
Terminal Railroad incumbents had claimed that their organization was open to all railroads. 
AP’s membership policy depended on who the applicant competed with. Applicants who did not 
compete with an existing member faced a “very simple and non-burdensome road for admission” 
which did not require “payment of money or … any other onerous terms.”41 By comparison, 
applicants who did compete had “a hard road to travel.”42 AP had a long history of excluding 
competing newspapers. This policy had been relaxed by legal challenges, but only slightly.43 By 
1945, an applicant who competed with an existing member still had to be approved by a majority 
vote of all existing members and had to pay AP a sum equal to ten percent of all assessments that 
                                                            
40 The District Court described AP’s assessment formula this way: “In levying assessments upon 
members it divides the United States into areas determined by cities, with a surrounding territory 
generally of not more than ten miles. The entire levy is allocated ‘fundamentally upon a plan of 
distributing the total cost in proportion to the population served by each member.’ Each allotment is then 
divided among all the members in the same ‘field’ and city in proportion to their number, not to their 
circulation. In the course of its existence AP has accumulated tangible property, estimated by it at more 
than $7,000,000 – most of which is in the City of New York. In addition, it appraises its ‘good-will’ and 
other intangibles at $12,000,000.” United States v. AP, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Since 1986 AP 
has assessed fees based on circulation. Associated Press, “Member Choice Product Guide,” at 3. 
http://www.apexchange.com/BizUI/Front1/docs/MemberChoiceProductGuide.pdf. 
 
41 Associated Press, supra, at 8. 
 
42 Id. at 10. 
 
43 Id. at 10. AP originally gave existing members an absolute veto power over applications from 
competing newspapers. This was struck down by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1900. Thereafter, AP was 
reorganized in New York and adopted new By-Laws which gave members a "right of protest" that could 
only be overruled by a four-fifths vote of the organization’s membership. This rule was watered down 
following a 1942 investigation by the US Justice Department. However, new entrants still had to (a) pay 
the Association 10% of all assessments paid by competing AP members since 1900, (b) relinquish any 
exclusive rights to any news or news services other than AP, and (c) receive a majority vote of existing 
members in person or by proxy.  
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its competitor had paid since 1900.44 As Justice Frankfurter noted, “reciprocal self-interest” 
almost always persuaded a majority to vote no.45  
In Terminal Railroad, the Court had also been careful to note that forced sharing was only 
justified where plaintiffs “had no reasonable means” to access other facilities. The AP Court 
broadened this concept and said that AP could not be duplicated even though partial substitutes 
were available.46 Five Justices affirmed the district court’s order holding that AP could no longer 
consider new applicants’ “ability … to compete with members in the same city and field” in 
deciding whether to grant admissions.47 
In Lorain Journal48, a dominant newspaper refused to sell ad space to any merchant who also 
purchased ads from a competing radio station.49  This meant that advertisers could buy radio or 
newspaper ads but not both. The court struck down the practice, arguing that at least “some” 
businesses considered newspaper advertising “essential for the promotion of…sales in Lorain 
County”50 and an “indispensable medium of advertising for many Lorain concerns.”51  
The defendant responded “… that it had a right as a private business concern to select its 
customers and to refuse to accept advertisements from whomever it pleases.” However, the 
                                                            
44 Id. at 11. The term was said to constitute a “stipulated ‘asset value,’” presumably in rough 
compensation for capital that AP had acquired over the years. Rival services UP and INS required similar 
compensation to incumbents. Id. at 13-14.  
 
45 Id.at  27 
 
46 The record showed that the US hosted “between twenty and thirty” wire services. Furthermore, at least 
two of these -- U.P.I. and I.N.S. -- were sizable and appeared to conduct a “brisk rivalry” with AP. Id. at 
39 (Murphy dissenting). One possible explanation is that AP members paid about $10,000 to join AP and 
received $13 million worth of news. By comparison, UPI subscribers paid $6,000 to receive $8.6m worth 
of news. Id. at 40. Based on this observation, it is at least possible to argue that U.P.I. was not an 
acceptable substitute for the larger and more expensive A.P.  
 
47 Id. at 21. However, as Justice Douglas pointed out, this stopped short of deciding whether AP could use 
non-discriminatory rules to achieve similar ends, most obviously by freezing its membership at current 
levels. Id. at 24 (Douglas, dissenting). See also Hovenkamp, supra, Vol. IIIB at 202. 
 
48 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 US 143 (1951)  
 
49 Id. at 148 – 149. 
 
50 Id. at 148. 
 
51 Id. at 152. 
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Court rejected this defense on the ground that “(m)ost rights are qualified" 52, and “a purposeful 
means of monopolizing interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act.”53 
The defendant was essential to print advertising because it was the dominant newspaper; there 
was no effective substitute. The synergy for advertisers was that each ad attracts more readers. 
This happens both directly (readers want to see more advertisements in one place) and indirectly 
(the newspaper has more resources to gather news). Thus, even though access was denied to 
customers instead of rivals, the key feature of an essential facilities claim – synergy – remained. 
The Court did not discuss which structures would constrain pricing, presumably because it 
believed the Journal would offer the same terms to any advertiser. But it did order sharing. 
Otter Tail54 involves a private utility company that operated two distinct businesses. The first 
transmitted electricity over long distances. Here, prices were negotiated on the open market 
backed by public rate-setting when the parties failed to agree on terms. This business seems to 
have produced only modest profits. The second business was selling electricity to homes and 
businesses in the municipalities where it transmitted power. Prices were determined by long-term 
contracts which were so favorable that they generated ninety percent of Otter Tail’s revenue.55  
 
In the late 1960s, several municipalities began to establish their own municipal distribution 
systems when Otter Tail's franchises expired.56 This strategy, however, could only be 
implemented by paying Otter Tail to “wheel” the power from distant generating plants. Not 
wanting to lose its profitable retail business in the municipalities, Otter Tail refused.57 
 
The District Court ordered Otter Tail to interconnect at whatever “compensatory” rates and terms 
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) required.58 The Supreme Court affirmed, adding that the 
FPC had the authority to set rates for transmitting and wheeling power.59 
                                                            
52 Id. at 155. 
 
53 Id. at 155. 
 
54 Otter Tail Power Co. v. US, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 
55 Id. at 387. 
 
56 Id. at 371. 
 
57 Id. at 368.  
 
58 Id. at 375. 
 
59 Id. at note 7 (FPC power to order interconnection includes power to prescribe compensation and 
reimbursement”) Joseph R. Coker, “Saving Otter Tail: The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Electric 
Power Post-Trinko” 33 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2005) (Court “ordered Otter Tail to give the municipalities 
access to its transmission lines but delegated the more difficult task--the terms of such access--to a 
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Otter Tail’s transmission capacity was clearly “essential” to the provision of municipal power in 
the sense that it was economically infeasible for a local municipality to duplicate it. Moreover, 
sharing was physically feasible in that it did not damage Otter Tail’s ability to serve other 
customers.60 Importantly, Otter Tail had built the power lines knowing that it could only earn 
revenue by carrying power at a regulated price.61 If Otter Tail preferred to leave capacity unused, 
there had to be an indefensible reason.62  
 
The Court emphasized that there were no “engineering factors” that would prevent service by 
Otter Tail’s shared facility (the transmission lines).63 The transmission lines in Otter Tail were 
similar to the facilities in Terminal Railroad and AP in that they had unused capacity which 
made sharing efficient. The problem of efficient pricing was already solved in Otter Tail by 
regulation, but nondiscrimination in the “wheeling” of power was outside the statute. Otter Tail 
was trying to exploit this regulatory gap to leverage power over its regulated transmission lines 
into a more profitable adjacent market, municipal power. “The record makes abundantly clear 
that Otter Tail used its monopoly power in the towns in its service area to foreclose competition 
or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the antitrust 
laws.”64 This foreclosure is what the District Court redressed, with agreement from the Supreme 
Court. 
 
While Terminal Railroad and AP can be understood as Section 1 cases, Otter Tail was a Section 
2 case.  By the late 1970s the Courts’ newfound willingness to find that facilities were 
“essential” had invited a flood of lower court litigation involving access to such disparate 
facilities as stock exchanges, produce markets, real estate listing services, electricity and gas 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
regulatory agency.”) Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that Congress has deliberately refrained from 
making line operators into common carriers. Id. at 384 
60 Id. at 381. 
 
61 As the Supreme Court later recognized, Otter Tail “was already in the business of providing a service to 
certain customers (power transmission over its network), and refused to provide the same service to 
certain other customers.” Verizon Comms., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 
62 Justice Stewart addressed this issue in his dissent by noting that “As a retailer of power, Otter Tail 
asserted a legitimate business interest in keeping its lines free for its own power sales.” Id at 374. 
However, this argument assumes that Otter Tail’s retail business had some chance of filling its lines to 
full capacity. In fact, the rise of municipal power systems suggests that the opposite was happening and 
that Otter Tail’s retail business was shrinking.  
 
63 Id. at 378. 
 
64 Id. at 377. 
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networks, airports, sports stadiums, phone systems,65 raw materials, contracting advantages,66 
replacement parts, IP licenses, airline reservation systems, harbor/railroad facilities, power 
generation or phone networks, airport landing and takeoff slots and ground services,67 two way 
billing, voice mail,68 cell phone roaming contracts, and short haul rail lines.69 The doctrine 
reached its most expansive form in MCI Comms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.70  
 
The issue in MCI was that MCI wanted to interconnect with AT&T’s local telephone exchanges 
so that it could compete in the long-distance telephone market. AT&T refused and used stalling 
tactics to stop regulators from intervening. MCI brought claims against AT&T under Section 2.71 
Eventually the interconnection issue was solved because, in a parallel case, AT&T was being 
broken up into local exchanges and long distance service. 72 However, MCI also sought damages 
for AT&T’s past refusals to interconnect, and won. The trial court awarded $600 million in 
actual damages, leading to treble damages $1.8 billion.  An important consequence of the case is 
that sharing became a duty in its own right instead of being a remedy and alternative to 
divestiture. 
Crucially, the Court reinvents Terminal Railroad as a case about leveraging and refusal to deal, 
forgetting the synergies point. AT&T’s refusal to interconnect thus became an attempt to 
leverage its power over the local exchanges into a monopoly position in long distance service: 
“Such a refusal may be unlawful because a monopolist’s control of an essential facility 
(sometimes called a “bottleneck”) can extend monopoly power from one stage of production to 
                                                            
65 Lipsky (1999) 
 
66 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 US 284 (1985). 
 
67 Sergio Baches Opi, “The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property 
Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still 
Sacrosanct?” 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. L.J. 409-507 (2001) 
68 Marissa A. Piropato, “Open Access and the Essential Facilities Doctrine: Promoting Competition 
(2000).  
 
69 Pitoffsky, Patterson and Hooks, supra at 459. 
 
70 MCI Comms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d. 1081 (1982). MCI has become the 
“standard statement of the doctrine.” Lao, supra at 564.  
 
71 Id. at 1093. More specifically, plaintiffs claimed that MCI had “Unlawfully denied interconnections for 
FX and CCSA services; charged MCI excessive and discriminatory interconnection rates for local 
distribution; harassed MCI through delays, improper installation and maintenance.” Id. at 1096. 
 
72 Id. at 1110  (noting that regulators and congress were implementing “sweeping” changes and “massive 
restructuring” to address “larger concerns about broad pro-competitive policy, economic concentration, 
and political power.”) 
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another, and from one market into another. Thus, the antitrust laws have imposed on firms 
controlling an essential facility the obligation to make the facility available on non-
discriminatory terms.”  
Both MCI and Otter Tail involve the synergies of a physical network. In Otter Tail, the physical 
network consists of the transmission capacity, and in MCI, the physical network consists of 
AT&T’s control over local exchanges. In both cases, the issue before the Court was that the 
owner of the essential facility (the network) was trying to leverage its power over the essential 
facility (the network) into an adjacent market. In Otter Tail, the adjacent market was distribution 
of power to municipalities. In MCI, the adjacent market was long-distance telephone service.  
The two cases together divert the purpose of sharing away from its original purpose, which was 
to harness synergies, to another purpose, which is to prevent leveraging into an adjacent market. 
It is the open access feature of sharing that accomplishes this. Even if the main reason for open 
access is to maximize the synergies that are available through sharing, open access has an 
important side benefit, namely to limit the facility owner from leveraging power over the facility 
into adjacent markets. 
The MCI Court also rationalizes 1970s-era lower court case law to frame what have since 
become the conventional elements of an essential facilities claim:73 
1. control of the essential facility by a monopolist;  
 
2. a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility;  
 
3. the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
 
4. the feasibility of providing the facility. 
In MCI, the first and third elements were reasonably clear. The second element (inability to 
duplicate) qualified the concept of “essentiality” by adding that plaintiff must not be able to 
duplicate the facility on its own. This would have been simple enough to understand if limited to 
physical or technical impossibility, but the Court made it clear that economic and regulatory 
obstacles as well as business reasons would suffice.74 In practice, the issue seemed to turn on 
                                                            
73 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (West 2011) at 
337. (“In MCI, the Seventh Circuit stated the essential facility doctrine in a way that has influenced 
numerous subsequent decisions.”)  
 
74 Id. at 1133 (explaining that it was not “economically feasible” for MCI to duplicate Bell's local 
facilities “involving millions of miles of cable and line to individual homes and businesses,” that 
“regulatory authorization could not be obtained for such an uneconomical duplication,” and that “No 
legitimate business or technical reason was shown for AT&T's denial of the requested interconnections.”) 
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whether plaintiff would normally be expected to construct the facility in the course of building 
its network.75 But when was that? One natural economic argument would have been to say when 
plaintiff’s own business was not large enough to build a facility that could achieve economies of 
scale. In fact, the Court said nothing. 
Finally, the Court provided little guidance on the fourth element (feasibility of sharing). 
Infeasibility had been fairly obvious for simple assets like railway bridges and news stories. 
However, the US phone system was easily the most complex technology of its time. Claiming 
that sharing would not degrade the system would be one thing, but proving it would be another. 
In the end, the Court threw up its hands and relied on regulators’ expertise to establish the 
point.76 In doing so, it left the question of when courts were competent to intervene in complex 
markets. 
We now come to Aspen Skiing77, which is one of the most confusing cases in the canon. Here the 
facilities were four ski mountains. 78 As in Terminal Railroad, the facilities were originally 
operated by separate proprietors, but by the late 1960s, ownership had been consolidated so that 
the plaintiff and defendant were the only two ski operators left. The defendant controlled three of 
four mountains. At first, the parties cooperated by selling a joint lift pass to all four mountains. 
This produced an important marketing synergy since skiers only had to stand in line once to ski 
all four mountains, and the Court accepts as a fact that skiers are better off having access to all 
four mountains. Separate lift tickets would force skiers to choose between standing in line twice 
or limiting themselves to a subset of the available mountains.79 Apparently the defendant 
benefited from forcing skiers to make this choice, since the defendant had more mountains to 
offer.  
                                                            
75 Id. at 1148 (“There was no sufficient explanation as to why MCI, on the one hand, was building its own 
network, and, on the other, was entitled to access in the interim to AT&T's facilities. Thus, the jury lacked 
sufficient evidence to conclude that these interconnections were essential). 
 
76 The Court also invoked regulators’ opinion as additional evidence that duplication would not be 
feasible. Id. at 1146-47 (“FCC itself characterized service within the LDAs as "essential" even though the 
new carriers had an option to duplicate them.”) 
 
77 Aspen Skiing, 421 US 585 (1985). 
 
78 Id. at 588-89. The region had originally been served by three mountains operated by three separate ski 
companies. A fourth mountain was added in 1967. The Court argued that it was not feasible for plaintiff 
to develop additional mountains because of topography, financing, regulatory barriers, and political 
opposition. 
 
79 Id. at 605. 
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The Court ordered the parties to sell a combined lift ticket. The Court justified this order on the 
theory that it would restore “a pattern of distribution” that had existed in the competitive market 
“for several years.”80  
Aspen was novel because sharing would require the parties to set ticket prices jointly. This 
seemed to invite collusive price setting in violation of Section 1.81 Earlier cases had avoided 
collusive price setting either because there was regulatory oversight (MCI, Otter Tail) or because 
non-profit entities were created to set prices (AP, Terminal Railroad). The sharing in Aspen had 
a new structure, namely, the price was jointly set and the revenues were shared according to the 
number of skiers who used each mountain.82 This forced the parties “to compete for the daily 
loyalties of the skiers that had purchased the tickets”83 so that any collusive profit would be 
redistributed to skiers in the form of “free” amenities.84  
The most famous peculiarity of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Aspen is that it nowhere uses the 
words “essential facility.” This persuaded lower courts to restyle essential facilities cases as 
monopolization or attempted monopolization cases.85 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seemed 
to acknowledge an essential facilities doctrine as recently as 1999.86 
The first (and so far only) US case to interpret essential facilities in the IP context was Intergraph 
Corp. v. Intel Corp.87 Intergraph had traditionally made workstations using chips containing its 
                                                            
80Id. at 604 As Prof. Hovenkamp notes, the Court must also have understood that shared lift tickets were 
routinely used and known to be efficient “in … other markets” around the country. Hovenkamp IIIB at 
212. 
 
81 Id. at 598 (recounting defense argument "that there clearly cannot be a requirement of cooperation 
between competitors.") 
 
82 Id. at 591 
 
83 “Moreover, Highlands wanted to continue to divide revenues on the basis of actual usage, as that 
measure of distribution allowed it to compete for the daily loyalties of the skiers who had purchased the 
tickets.” Id. at 592. 
 
84 The scheme had the potential weakness that the parties’ ability to add amenities to ski slopes could well 
encounter diminishing returns. This would not matter, however, if the competition extended to cash 
rebates.  
 
85 Sergio Baches Opi, “The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property 
Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still 
Sacrosanct?” 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. L.J. 409-507 (2001) at 438. 
 
86 ATT v California, 525 U.S. 366 (1999)   “The incumbents argue that § 251(d)(2) codifies something 
akin to the "essential facilities" doctrine of antitrust theory… opening up only those "bottleneck" elements 
unavailable elsewhere in the marketplace.”) 
87 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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own patented “Clipper” technology. In 1993 it switched to using Intel chips instead. Four years 
later, Intergraph sued Intel for violating its patents. Intel retaliated by terminating Intergraph's 
access to special proprietary information and pre-release products.88 Intergraph sued on the 
theory that Intel’s information and products were an "essential facility" under Section 2. The 
district court granted a preliminary injunction but the Federal Circuit reversed. 
      
The Federal Circuit relied on the fact that Intergraph and Intel did not compete in the same 
market. Intergraph made workstations while Intel made chips. Since the parties were neither 
actual nor potential competitors, the Court found that there was no threat to competition under 
the antitrust laws.89 The Court distinguished Otter Tail, Aspen, and MCI on the ground that each 
had involved some attempt to monopolize direct competition with the defendant's facility (MCI, 
Aspen) or involved an attempt to monopolize a downstream market where defendant and plaintiff 
competed (Otter Tail).90 The essential facilities claim did not fail because intellectual property 
was implicated, and therefore the case does not resolve whether intellectual property might 
constitute an essential facility in U.S. law. 
 
Finally we come to Trinko, in which the Supreme Court expresses skepticism about whether the 
essential facility doctrine exists at all. 
 
In Trinko, Verizon Communications operated a local telephone exchange, and the service 
provider AT&T wanted to offer telephone services as well under the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.91  AT&T claimed that Verizon failed to provide adequate access. AT&T customer Trinko 
brought a class action against Verizon under the Sherman Act, claiming that he had been injured 
when Verizon denied its essential facility (the local telephone exchange) to competitors.92 The 
Second Circuit held that Trinko had stated a valid antitrust claim.93  
The Supreme Court reversed on the narrow ground that Congress had already provided for 
access to the local telephone exchange under the 1996 Act.94 However, the Court did not stop 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
88  Id. at 1349 – 50. 
89 Id. at 1355. 
 
90 Id. at 1357.  
 
91 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 5. 
92 Id. at 404. 
 
93 Id. at 405. 
 
94 Id. at 408 (Antitrust actions to compel sharing do not exist in cases where “a state or federal agency has 
effective power to “compel sharing and to regulate its scope and terms.”) 
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there. Instead, it presented an extended and largely hostile view of the essential facilities idea, 
declaring that the Court had “never recognized such a doctrine.”95 Forced sharing, the Justices 
added, had “uncertain virtue.”96 While Aspen Skiing was “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 
liability,”97 Aspen itself was limited to the special case in which defendant’s actions in 
terminating “a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing” showed that it was 
willing to sacrifice “short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”98 By comparison, 
Verizon had never sold local telephone services to the public except when forced to do so on 
terms and rates set by Congress.99 The Court went on to warn that forced sharing ran a 
significant risk of “false positives” that would punish defendants for refusals that “might have 
nothing to do with exclusion.100 It also promised to mire courts in relief that they could not 
adequately supervise.101 Here the Court seems to have absorbed the idea that an essential 
facilities doctrine, if it were to exist, would be about preventing leverage, and not about the 
“lost” message of Terminal Railroad, namely, that synergies should be protected. 
Trinko suggests that there is an enhanced duty to share when the defendant had shared in the 
past, but sharing has been abandoned. The Trinko Court distinguishes Aspen on the basis that the 
ski resorts had previously shared the marketing of joint lift tickets. There had also been a 
previous sharing arrangement in Otter Tail (in that Otter Tail had wheeled power to the plaintiff 
municipality), and the Supreme Court restored that arrangement. In finding that Aspen is at the 
outer limits, the Court seems to suggest that, absent a previous sharing arrangement, sharing 
should not be required.  
But if our theory about synergies is correct, it should not matter whether firms have made 
previous business decisions to share or not to share. The firms’ past behavior might give 
evidence that synergies exist and we should be suspicious if companies refuse, but this is only 
evidence, and not the principle that creates a duty to share. The decision not to share can be made 
for many reasons, including that the parties feared Section 1 liability or that they simply missed a 
profit opportunity. The hard question is whether the absence of previous sharing arrangements is 
                                                            
95 Id. at 408. The Court did, however, stop short of “repudiat[ing] it here.”Id.  
 
96 Id. at 408. 
 
97 Id at 409. 
 
98 Id at 409 (emphasis original). 
 
99 Id at 409 – 410. By contrast, some lower courts had already used the doctrine to compel sharing of 
stadiums and pipelines which had not previously been offered to the public. Hovenkamp, supra, Vol. IIIB 
at 225. 
 
100 Id. at 414. 
 
101 Id. at 414. 
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dispositive in the other direction. If the firms had not previously shared, should the Court ever 
force sharing? Should it ever conclude that the value of the synergies outweighs the possibility of 
“false positives?” We return to this question in section VI. 
III. Europe Extends the Debate 
We begin by mentioning some cases that were decided as early as the 1970’s, and conclude with 
Microsoft.102  For the most part, these cases were decided in ways that would have been familiar 
to U.S. judges. Indeed, the European Court of Justice’s Bronner decision,103 which limited the 
essential facilities doctrine, foreshadowed Trinko in several ways. More recently, however, 
European courts have aggressively extended the concept of an essential facility to include 
intellectual property. This can be seen as a departure from U.S. practice, although it might be 
more accurate to say that the European Commission is entering territory where U.S. precedents 
are thin to non-existent. In the process, European courts have raised important issues about the 
extent to which essential facilities based on intellectual property can and should be treated 
differently from physical assets.  
Commercial Solvents104 is generally taken as the first important European case. The defendant 
held a dominant position in the materials used to make an industrial chemical, ethambutol, and 
supplied a manufacturer named Zoja. Zoja suspended its order for some years, and then wanted 
to resume. Meanwhile Commercial Solvents had changed its supply strategy, and refused. The 
Court of Justice held this to be an abuse of dominance, on grounds that Zoja had no feasible 
alternatives. For Zoja to supply its own raw material would be prohibitively expensive.  
To interpret Commercial Solvents as an essential facilities case as we understand the term, we 
must interpret Commercial Solvent’s unique ability to supply an essential raw material as 
defining an essential facility, and we would have to see a synergy among firms who share the 
facility, the facility being the capacity to supply the raw material. In that sense, a production 
plant for raw materials is not too different from a railroad bridge, and the production capacity 
should be shared. However, the economic consequences of sharing are entirely different in the 
two cases. In Terminal Railroad, the Court could control the price of the input by insisting that 
the holding company for the essential facility not earn profit. There is no comparable provision 
for controlled pricing in Commercial Solvents. The Court has nothing to say about the price at 
which the raw material would be made available to Zoja.  
                                                            
102 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, EC Commission v. Microsoft. 
 
103 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 
Case C-7/97, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112. 
 
104 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission, Joined 
Cases 6/73 & 7/73, 1974 E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309. 
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In Port of Rodby105, a publicly owned port became indispensable for shipping when the Danish 
government denied a Swedish shipping company a permit to construct its own private facility. At 
the same time, the Port denied the Swedish company access to its own facilities. The Port argued 
that the plaintiff had not established that there was unsatisfied demand for ferry service, and that 
entry would simply detract from their own business. The Commission rejected this argument, 
and also stated that “the Port of Rodby was not saturated.” On this basis the Commission 
required that the Port either share its existing facilities or allow the plaintiff to build a new 
facility. The opinion does not comment on terms of access. 
 
On the facts understood by the Commission, the Port exhibited the synergy always present in 
natural monopoly with unused capacity, and thus the case is consistent with the idea that there 
should be open access when there are substantial synergies. 
 
Magill106 concerned program listings of three television broadcasters in Ireland. When the 
plaintiff Magill tried to improve his TV listing service by listing the programming for an entire 
week, instead of the more limited periods he previously published under license, the three 
broadcasters sued for copyright infringement. In upholding the judgment for Magill, the 
European Court of Justice says that the conduct “thus prevented the appearance of a new 
product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the appellants did not 
offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand,” 107 which is an “abuse”,108 and that 
“(t)he applicants were thus using their copyright in the programme listings … to secure a 
monopoly in the derivative market of weekly television guides...” The ECJ adds that “The Court 
of First Instance also regarded it as significant in that regard that the applicants had authorized, 
free of charge, the publication of their daily listings and highlights of their weekly programmes 
in the press in both Ireland and the United Kingdom.”109 
 
According to unofficial, if semi-public, gossip, the Commission was moved by the fact that TV 
listings were an “unmeritorious” species of IP. 110 Perhaps they thought the IP was trivial, and 
                                                            
105 Commission Decision 94/119/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 055) 52. 
 
106 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. Commission, Joined 
Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718. 
 
107 Id. at para. 54. 
 
108 Id. at para. 54. 
 
109 Id. at para. 29. 
 
110 Opi, supra at 461. (“Professor Korah reports that officials of the Commission’s legal service pointed 
out, in their personal capacities, that Magill should be limited to ‘unmeritorious kinds of intellectual 
property.’”) 
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the incentive provided by copyright was superfluous, since other, non-trivial incentives already 
existed to make the listing. Defendant could not sell its product (broadcasting) without also 
having a program listing. The incentive to produce and disseminate programs will be the same 
irrespective of whether the broadcasters are protected from competition in the television guide 
market.”111 
In Magill there were actually three essential facilities -- the program listings -- which could be 
combined to create a joint product with synergies. The usefulness to viewers of the joint listing 
was in their ability to compare program listings side-by-side in a given time slot. The 
Commission, endorsed by the ECJ, opens the use of these listings to all entrants, not just to the 
plaintiffs. The ECJ endorses the Commission’s requirement that the three broadcasters put an 
end to their “breach” by “supplying ... third parties on request and on a non-discriminatory basis 
with their individual advance weekly programme listings and by permitting reproduction of those 
listings by such parties".112  
The concept of “essential” in Magill clearly means that there were no feasible substitutes. In 
Magill, there is literally no substitute, while in Commercial Solvents, Otter Tail and MCI, 
substitutes were simply infeasible at reasonable cost. However, Magill differs from Commercial 
Solvents, Otter Tail and MCI in that the defendant broadcasters were not trying to leverage their 
control over the essential facility into an adjacent market – the weeklong TV guide – but were 
rather trying to leave the market unsupplied. Commercial Solvents differs from the other three 
cases in that the synergy is simply an economy of scale. By ordering sharing, the court harnessed 
this synergy, but did not control pricing of the input. Given that the raw material is still 
controlled by a monopolist, it is hard to see how “competition” would be an improvement for 
consumers. The court does not comment on this. 
In Bronner, 113the defendant was a dominant newspaper publisher with a home-delivery system. 
Plaintiff was a small publisher that wanted to share the home-delivery system. Defendant argued 
that making its system available to all Austrian publishers would lead to congestion by 
“exceed[ing] the natural capacity of its system,”114 and that it would allow competitors to free-
ride on its “great administrative and financial investment.” 115 Moreover, it had never shared its 
facilities on anything resembling the terms requested.116  
                                                            
111 Opi, supra at 460. 
 
112 Id. at para. 12. 
 
113 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 
Case C-7/97, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112. 
 
114 Id. at para. 9. 
 
115 Id. at para. 9. 
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The Court declined to enforce sharing, explaining that plaintiff could negotiate equally 
advantageous sharing arrangements with other parties or create its own distribution system.117 
Even small players could achieve the required economies of scale.118  Sharing was not required 
to maintain the viability of the plaintiff newspaper.  
On first reading, this case seems out of line with the theory of essential facilities we will 
articulate below, namely, that sharing should be required whenever it provides synergies and can 
be achieved on terms that do not compromise competition. The potential synergy in Bronner is 
that the plaintiff and defendant can reduce costs by sharing the defendant’s unused capacity. 
However, in declining to force sharing, the Court does not rely on any argument about capacity. 
Instead it relies on the argument that, absent sharing, there is no impediment to the plaintiff 
serving the market. It can use a different distribution system. The argument is that even though 
sharing might be efficient, it is not necessary for competition in the market.  
Does the Court thereby give up on the synergies available from sharing? No! If the defendant 
will face competition from the plaintiff in any case, then the defendant has an incentive to offer 
sharing on terms that reduce costs and make both firms better off. Intervention by the Court 
should not be necessary to achieve sharing – the market should solve it. This reasoning is not 
explicit in the case, but it allows us to reconcile Bronner with Commercial Solvents and Terminal 
Railroad. In all three cases, the defendant(s) had unused capacity, but in the latter two cases, they 
were ordered by the court to share it.  
Why would it make sense for the court to order sharing in Terminal Railroad and Commercial 
Solvents, but not in Bronner? The cases differ in an important way, articulated by the court. In 
Commercial Solvents and Terminal Railroad, it was impossible to enter the market without 
sharing the defendant’s unused capacity. By refusing to share, the defendants could keep the 
rivals out of the market. This was not true in Bronner. As a consequence, sharing was much 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
116 Id. at para. 9 (“It adds that the position of Wirtschaftsblatt is not comparable to that of Der Standard, 
since the publisher of the former also entrusted the Mediaprint group with printing and the whole of 
distribution, including sale in kiosks, so that home-delivery constituted only part of a package of 
services.”) and para. 30 (denying relief on ground that service had not  been made available to other 
parties except where “other services were not entrusted to Mediaprint at the same time.”) 
 
117 Id. at para. 44 (“Moreover, it does not appear that there are any technical, legal or even economic 
obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult, for any other publisher of daily 
newspapers to establish, alone or in cooperation with other publishers, its own nationwide home-delivery 
scheme and use it to distribute its own daily newspapers.”) 
 
118 Id at para. 45 (“It should be emphasised in that respect that, in order to demonstrate that the creation of 
such a system is not a realistic potential alternative and that access to the existing system is therefore 
indispensable, it is not enough to argue that it is not economically viable by reason of the small 
circulation of the daily newspaper or newspapers to be distributed.”) 
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more likely to arise as a private arrangement in Bronner than in Commercial Solvents or 
Terminal Railroad. And even if the sharing arrangement did not materialize, there would still be 
competition in the market. 
Intriguingly, Bronner distinguishes Magill on grounds that the sharing rules for IP could be 
markedly different.119 In retrospect, this opened the door to a radically expanded doctrine.  
In IMS Health120, IMS was a market research company that provided regional data reporting 
services to pharmaceutical companies, regarding sales of pharmaceutical products throughout 
Germany. These reports were based on data purchased from pharmaceutical wholesalers, which 
were checked and formatted according to a brick structure. Each brick represents a geographical 
area with at least four to five pharmacies. IMS has refined its brick structure since its inception in 
1969 with the help of the pharmaceutical industry. IMS brought a copyright infringement suit 
against two competitors, AzyX and NDC, which it suspected were selling data reports based on 
the same 1860-brick structure. 
The Commission ordered IMS to license the brick structure, finding evidence of what economists 
call network effects. Any report formatted according to a new structure would have to be 
"translated" into the 1860-brick structure in order to allow pharmaceutical companies to compare 
data from earlier years and from third parties, who also use the 1860-brick structure. Because it 
would be costly and inconvenient, many pharmaceutical companies had said they would not be 
willing to switch to another standard. There were also legal and technical structures which 
limited the choice of alternative bricks. The brick structure had become “de facto industry 
standard.”  
Here, the brick structure is the essential facility, and the synergy is provided by network effects. 
As in Magill, the essential facility is intellectual property. 
Finally we come to Microsoft,121 which also implicates intellectual property. Microsoft refused to 
provide makers of work group server operating systems with information that would allow their 
software to operate seamlessly with desktops running on Windows. Microsoft had made this 
information available for previous versions of Windows. The Commission found that there was 
“no actual or potential substitute for the refused input” and that Microsoft had used this 
advantage to achieve a “rapid rise to dominance” in the adjacent market for server operating 
                                                            
119 Id. at para. 43. Distinguishing Magill on grounds that “case-law on the exercise of an intellectual 
property right” may not be applicable to “the exercise of any property right whatever.”  
 
120 Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of October 26, 2001, IMS Health Inc. v. 
Commission, Case T-184/01 R, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3193, [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 2. 
 
121 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, EC Commission v. Microsoft. 
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systems. Conversely, letting competitors access the information would allow them to provide 
“new and enhanced products” to the benefit of consumers.122  
 
Microsoft’s conduct constituted an abuse of its dominant position under Article 82123. 
Microsoft’s normal IP rights could not justify this behavior124, particularly since Microsoft was 
not being asked to provide actual software125 and there was no danger that the disclosures would 
help competitors to clone Windows.126 The Commission ordered Microsoft to provide its 
information to competitors on “reasonable and non-discriminatory terms”. To the extent that 
remuneration was required, it could not “reflect the strategic value stemming from Microsoft’s 
market power” over operating systems for PCs or servers.127 Here the Commission addresses the 
two problems we mentioned at the beginning of Section II: It is structuring the sharing terms in a 
way that limits Microsoft’s use of market power, and controlling leverage over the adjacent 
server market by ordering that the sharing be nondiscriminatory.  
 
The case led to backlash and criticism, and in 2009 the European Commission published 
Guidance to their enforcement policy.128 The Guidance defines a facility as indispensable or 
essential, “where there is no actual or potential substitute on which competitors in the 
downstream market could rely so as to counter — at least in the long-term – the negative 
consequences of the refusal. In this regard the Commission will normally make an assessment of 
whether competitors could effectively duplicate the input produced by the dominant undertaking 
in the foreseeable future.” 129 
 
The Guidance elaborated the Commission’s view by arguing that the dominant undertaking 
could not charge a price so high that “an equally efficient competitor could not trade profitably in 
the downstream market.” The benchmark for this inquiry would be the dominant firm’s own long 
                                                            
122 Id. at para. 18 
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126 Id. at para. 21 
 
127 Id. at para. 31 
 
128 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, Official Journal C 045, 24/02/2009 P. 0007 – 
0020. 
 
129 Id. at para. 83 
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run average incremental cost (LRAIC) in the downstream market.130 Facilities would not be 
deemed essential would “normally” depend on whether competitors could effectively duplicate 
the input produced by the dominant undertaking in the foreseeable future.”131 While intervention 
would not be limited to cases where the good had been supplied before, past sales would make 
the case for sharing stronger by showing that the owner would receive “adequate compensation.” 
The dominant company could, however, rebut this by showing that circumstances had 
changed.132 The most likely consumer harm seen by the Commission is where refusal would 
prevent competitors from “bringing innovative goods or services to market” or conducting 
“follow-on innovation.”133 However, the dominant firm could rebut this by arguing that supply 
would interfere with its ability to earn an adequate return on its investment and therefore 
“continue to invest in the future.”134 The dominant firm could also argue that supply would 
interfere with its own ability to innovate by bringing about “structural changes” including “the 
development of follow-on innovation by competitors.135 
IV. Essential facilities and synergies 
The cases above are the ones most cited for the essential facilities idea. A difficulty in making 
sense of them is that synergy has become tangled up with other legal concepts like leveraging (in 
particular, leveraging power over the essential facility into another market) and general refusals 
to deal. In this section, we ask whether the above cases were correctly decided on the basis of 
synergy or must instead be understood (if at all) as preventing leveraging or as following from 
some other principle beyond this article. We point out why a duty to share based on synergies, 
properly implemented by the court, can also provide an antidote to leveraging.  
A threshold question is when there is a duty to share. That takes us into murky terrain that courts 
and commentators have mostly avoided. Any definition of “essential facility” runs the risk of 
producing a theory that takes in too much territory. On the other hand, if no definition is 
possible, there is something wrong with the theory.  
We propose that the elements of an essential facilities claim should be 
                                                            
130 Id. at para. 80 
 
131 Id. at para. 83 
 
132 Id. at para. 84 
 
133 Id. at para. 87 
 
134 Id. at para. 87 
 
135 Id. at para. 89 
 
26 
 
1. Sharing the facility would create synergies by 
 
a. improving the qualities of the members’ products, or reduces industry unit costs of 
producing them, while 
 
b. not raising the defendant-owner’s costs or restricting its ability to produce. 
 
2. The sharing can be structured to avoid cartelization in a way that 
 
a. makes consumers better off than without sharing, and 
 
b. preserves the incentive to invest in the facility in the first place. 
 
3. The defendant-owner has nevertheless refused to share. 
Our elements do not contradict existing law, but they refocus attention on Terminal Railroad’s 
original goal of preserving synergies, making that concept more central and more precise. Our 
elements differ slightly from the EC’s Guidance,136 which ignores synergy, and focuses on the 
lack of feasible substitutes for the facility. Our elements similarly improve on the MCI elements, 
which define “essential facility” in terms of “a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to 
duplicate the essential facility.” Introducing synergy makes these formless and undefined 
concepts unnecessary. 
One might ask whether the synergy concept should not go even further, to include any facility 
with unused capacity. In some of the cases we cite, the facility is duplicable, but duplication 
would be inefficient because there is unused capacity. The unused capacity can create a synergy 
in the form of cost reduction.  
We believe that the doctrine should not extend to cases where the facility can be feasibly 
duplicated. The practical reason is that it would drastically expand the number of cases that 
judges need to consider, and would require mundane inquiries into when and how usage could be 
expanded without impacting the defendant-owner. However, there is also a deeper theoretical 
reason, related to whether the owner of an existing facility can keep rivals out of the market by 
refusing to share.  
If entry will occur even without sharing, we would expect a profit-maximizing owner to offer 
access even without judicial intervention. The incumbent and the entrant can save the cost of 
                                                            
136 Id. at 83 (“where there is no actual or potential substitute on which competitors in the downstream 
market could rely so as to counter — at least in the long-term – the negative consequences of the refusal. 
In this regard the Commission will normally make an assessment of whether competitors could 
effectively duplicate the input produced by the dominant undertaking in the foreseeable future.”) 
 
27 
 
duplication by sharing the existing facility, and they will be competitors in any case. Of course 
the incumbent might still refuse to share if he will need the excess capacity in the future. This is 
a market judgment which courts should ordinarily respect.  
Suppose, however, that entry would not occur without sharing, either because entry is impossible 
(for example, because there is only one suitable site for a bridge) or because duplication would 
be uneconomical for any conceivable alliance of competitors, no matter how well financed. 
Because entry will not occur, the owner of the existing facility feels no threat, and will not 
facilitate competition that would otherwise not occur. This is the situation in which the essential 
facilities doctrine has been invoked.137 
We recognize, of course, that if the monopolist owner is required to share, and shares the facility 
at a high access price, the resulting “competition” might not improve the welfare of consumers. 
Harvesting the synergy of shared capacity will mainly help consumers if cartelization is 
avoided.138 This is why we add the qualifier that there is an appropriate sharing rule that makes 
consumers better off than without sharing.  
In Intergraph, Intel supplied an input, chips, that were impossible to duplicate, but refusing to 
supply Intergraph did not harm consumers in any obvious way, given that Intergraph had 
competitors who were still supplied by Intel. On these grounds, we believe Intergraph was 
correctly decided, although this was not the reasoning of the court. Compare with Commercial 
Solvents, in which the essential facilities claim succeeded. Commercial Solvents also had unique 
control over an input, and was ordered to supply the input to Zoja. The case differs from 
Intergraph in that Commercial Solvents competed with Zoja in the end user market. However, 
the court does not explain why the order to share might improve consumer welfare. An 
improvement seems unlikely, given that Commercial Solvents still controlled the price of the 
input. Without such an argument, we do not see that Commercial Solvents was correctly decided. 
Because every potential user of the facility has the same cause of action, the “open access” or 
“nondiscrimination” aspect of sharing is understood.139 The shared facility should be available 
                                                            
137 We thus agree with the distinction made in Bronner. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust 
Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (West 2011)at 316 (“[p]ermitting firms to piggyback on 
their rivals’ investment when they can develop alternative assets for themselves impedes both innovation 
and competition.”) and at 321 (“[I]f antitrust is going to impose a duty to deal on dominant firms, the 
obligation must be limited to inputs that the competitive market is not realistically capable of producing.”) 
 
138 We do not know of a case where consumers would be better off with sharing at the monopoly price, 
although with strong enough synergies, that could happen. If there is no way to structure sharing so as to 
constrain the price, it would then be in the public interest to allow sharing even without a constraint on 
pricing. 
 
139 However, in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 US 284 
(1985), the Court recognized an exception and said that exclusion could not be seen as a per se violation 
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on the same terms to anyone who wants to use it. As we discuss further below, courts have 
enforced open access. This has had the ancillary benefit of preventing owners of essential 
facilities from leveraging their power over the facility into adjacent markets.  
The sharing arrangements we have in mind would be similar to the nonprofit organizations we 
saw in Terminal Railroad and Associated Press, although other sharing arrangements might have 
procompetitive effects as well. The next section categorizes the sharing arrangements that have 
so far materialized, and explains their virtues. As courts have become more focused on open 
access to prevent leveraging, the original message of Terminal Railroad, that zeal for antitrust 
enforcement should not sacrifice the synergies from sharing, has been lost. The prevention of 
leveraging is incidental to the doctrine, not its essence. 
Our two-pronged definition of essentiality may eliminate some of the cases in the canon. In 
Commercial Solvents, even an efficient and well-financed rival firm could not duplicate the 
wholesale supply provided by Commercial Solvents, because the raw materials were solely 
available from Commercial Solvents. The facility creates synergy through its economies of scale. 
Moreover, the wholesale supply satisfies the EC’s definition of essentiality. However, even 
though sharing seems to provide competition in the downstream market, the case does not tell us 
(and it is not obvious) that sharing makes consumers better off. The ambiguity arises because the 
wholesaler maintains control of the input price. If marginal costs are increasing in each firm’s 
production technology, it would be possible that supplying the market with two firms might 
lower costs, but production will not be efficiently divided between the firms because one of the 
firms is paying a price above marginal cost for the essential input.  
The synergies that must be present in essential facilities come in several forms. Some are 
physical. In Terminal Railroad splitting the various routes across the Mississippi into competing 
(and uncoordinated) organizations would have cost more and provided poorer service. A facility 
can be essential (on a sliding scale) whenever production entails very high fixed costs and an 
incumbent’s production facility has excess capacity.140  
Facilities can have synergies because they are are nonrival, such as the news stories in 
Associated Press. It is not economically efficient to produce a nonrival good twice.  
In Aspen and Magill, the synergy stems from complements. In Aspen, the dominant firm owned 
three mountains and its rival owned one. Making all four available under a common lift ticket 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
of the antitrust laws. There will presumably always be extenuating circumstances where exclusion is 
reasonable.  
 
140 Areeda advocates a criterion consistent with Bronner that asks whether the plaintiff could feasibly 
enter the market without a sharing arrangement. Entry might be feasible even if it is not efficient, that is, 
even if the incumbent has enough capacity for both firms.  
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would have made skiers better off. In Magill the would-be TV guide publisher wanted to 
combine the dominant firm’s listings with those of its rivals. Once again, consumers would have 
benefited from the synergy. In both cases, the dominant firm preferred to frustrate the synergy on 
the theory that it could make higher profits that way. For example, defendant in Aspen calculated 
that forcing skiers to choose which lift ticket to buy would lead to higher sales for its three-
mountain package rather than the one mountain. The plaintiff (the one-mountain ski company) 
sought to restore the synergy by proposing many joint marketing arrangements. None was 
accepted until the Court intervened. In Magill, there was a dominant broadcaster, whose TV 
listings were an essential ingredient for publishing a weekly TV guide. This firm was the hold-
out trying to block licensing to the third-party, Magill, who wanted to realize synergies by 
producing the guide.  
In IMS, MCI and Microsoft, the synergies stem from network effects. Networks can be either 
physical, as in MCI, or virtual. In MCI, MCI wanted to share AT&T’s physical telephone 
network, which would have been very costly to duplicate. Virtual networks arise when users 
prefer products that are heavily used by others. Virtual networks are defined by a standard, 
which defines the network and creates the benefits. If the standard is proprietary, it could well 
fall within our definition of an essential facility, although as we discuss below, the problems in 
applying the theory to intellectual property might be disqualifying.141 The database structure at 
issue in IMS is a virtual network. It is valuable to each user precisely because vendors and other 
users use it. The API’s in Microsoft also define a virtual network. The API’s gave to third-party 
developers the ability to contribute their innovations to the Windows network.  
V. Principled sharing rules 
In discrediting the essential facilities doctrine, the Trinko Court does not dwell on structural 
solutions for how to balance sharing with competition. Instead the Court reminds us that courts 
are not well positioned to do rate regulation, and therefore they should exercise caution in 
applying remedies that affect prices. However, Terminal Railroad teaches that sharing can be 
compelled in ways that constrain prices, and put less burden on the court than actual price 
setting. In this section, we investigate the price effects of different sharing rules, showing that 
they have different implications for competition. Our objective is to understand which ones 
achieve the synergies of sharing while maintaining the price-reducing virtues of competition. 
The sharing rules we will discuss here are 
1. Cost sharing (Terminal Railroad, Associated Press) 
 
2. Revenue sharing (Aspen) 
                                                            
141 One might argue that sharing of APIs was required in the E.C. Microsoft case because of network 
effects. However this is not a fact asserted or relied on by the E.C. or the Court of First Instance. 
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3. Compulsory licensing (Microsoft, Magill, IMS) 
 
4. Rate regulation and compulsory sales in adjacent markets (Otter Tail,MCI) 
 
Each of the sharing rules should be coupled with an open-access or nondiscrimination 
requirement.  Open access maximizes the benefits from sharing, at least until the facility 
becomes congested. It also has the ancillary benefit of preventing the owner of the facility from 
leveraging control over the facility into an adjacent market. We saw such attempts in MCI, Otter 
Tail, and Magill.  Mere control over prices for sharing would not have solved these attempts to 
leverage control over the essential facility into the adjacent market.  
1. Cost sharing 
In Terminal Railroad, the bridges and ferry were under the control of a subsidiary with a 
nonresiduary clause. This means that the subsidiary could not earn profit, and therefore must 
charge fees that sum to the cost of providing the service. There are nuances in calculating cost, 
such as whether it amortizes the fixed cost or simply allocates the current variable costs. To 
satisfy the elements above, all costs must be accounted for. Otherwise, anticipating the rule, the 
incentive to invest in the facility facilities would be undermined. 
If the annual costs are K, the easiest way to share the costs is to charge each member railroad an 
equal fixed share, say K/n if there are n member railroads. Since the assessment is a fixed cost, 
which does not depend on the railroad’s business decisions, it would have no impact on 
competition except to the extent that small railroad companies might find K/n unaffordable and 
be forced out. If that is not likely, then fixed shares are surely the cost-sharing rule that is best for 
competition. In fact, the market will be identical to the market that would arise if there were no 
river to cross.  
The fixed shares are nondiscriminatory if the railroad companies are similar in size, but 
otherwise fixed shares are very burdensome to small railroads, even if they don’t go out of 
business. Two alternative cost-sharing rules would be to share the costs according to the 
railroads’ relative revenue shares, measured in dollars, or according to their demand shares, 
measured, for example, by bushels of wheat hauled across the river. We show in the appendix 
that both these rules have an impact on prices, and provided there are the same number of 
railroads operating, fixed cost shares will lead to lower prices. 
Consider, for example, revenue-based cost sharing. This means that if a railroad earns 1/5 of the 
total revenue earned by member railroads, it will bear 1/5 of the cost.  
Suppose further that railroads compete for business by setting their rates. Ordinarily, if a railroad 
has some excess capacity, it will drop its price a little in order to undercut competitors and fill up 
the cars. This is the competitive effect that antitrust law is designed to achieve. Even a small 
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reduction in the rate will attract more business, and increase the railroad’s revenue while also 
benefiting producers and consumers.  
Now suppose instead that the costs are shared according to revenue shares. A railroad company 
that would otherwise be keen to cut its rates and fill up its cars will now hesitate. On one hand it 
gets more business and more revenue, but on the other hand, it increases the share of the bridge 
cost it pays. If the latter is too onerous, it will not cut its rates, or will cut them less. As a 
consequence, in aggregate, rates will be higher than if this effect were absent. (This is shown 
more formally in the appendix.) Nevertheless, it might be the best available rule under the 
constraint that the railroads must share the costs, especially if fixed shares are infeasible due to 
the problem of shutting out small companies. With revenue-based cost sharing, small companies 
pay a small portion of the cost, and on a unit basis, are not discriminated against. Furthermore, if 
many firms share the costs, the effect on equilibrium pricing might be quite small. 
The sharing arrangement in Associated Press was similar, except that the revenue shares were 
approximated by the number of residents in the geographic area served by each newspaper. 142  
This system is more like fixed shares than Terminal Railroad because a successful expansion of 
readership within the geographic area will not change the cost share. Instead, cost shares only 
change when the size of the distribution area increases or decreases, and this is not under the 
control of the publisher. 
2. Revenue Sharing  
In Aspen, the Court found that there were synergies for skiers in having access to the four 
mountains, and required that the tickets be marketed jointly in order to save skiers from the cruel 
choice between giving up a mountain and standing in line. The Court praised the historic rule in 
which each mountain’s share of revenue was equal to the proportion of skiers using its slopes.  
Unlike Terminal Railroad, the sharing rule in Aspen does not have a nonresiduary clause. 
Indeed, it would be quite extreme to impose zero profit on the ski resorts, and they would surely 
prefer to be broken up in the spirit of Standard Oil. The railroads in Terminal Railroad could 
remain profit centers while sharing the facility on nonprofit terms because the facility was only 
an input to the final product, which was rail transport. In contrast, the shared facility in Aspen is 
the product itself.  
In the Aspen sharing scheme, nothing constrains the price, and it would be natural to find that the 
owners charged a monopoly price for the four mountains. That is, the revenue-sharing solution in 
Aspen threatens to support the kind of cartel that Section 1 is designed to prevent.  
                                                            
142 Associated Press, “Member Choice Product Guide,” at 3. 
http://www.apexchange.com/BizUI/Front1/docs/MemberChoiceProductGuide.pdf. 
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However, there are two caveats to this conclusion. Even with a monopoly price for access to the 
four mountains, the owners will still compete because they share the revenue according to usage. 
To increase usage, they will find ways to give kickbacks to the skiers, perhaps giving them free 
brandy in the warming huts, or even cash rebates. With rebates, the net pricing could well 
become competitive again. Rebates are an odd and perhaps unreliable way to achieve 
competitive pricing, but the incentive to compete should not be underestimated. It does seem 
plausible that the sharing rule will benefit skiers despite the joint pricing. 
3. Compulsory licensing of intellectual property 
In Microsoft, Magill and IMS, the European Commission required that copyrighted works be 
made available for free to rivals. In Microsoft, it was the APIs at issue. The Court reasoned that 
the APIs were a byproduct of producing the operating system, and therefore costless. It therefore 
would not harm Microsoft to give them away for free. The reasoning in Magill and IMS was 
similar, as we have discussed. 
The cases raise the more general issue of how to handle intellectual property. Intellectual 
property never gets congested (it is nonrival), and sharing therefore creates synergies as outlined 
in the elements above. However, our element 2b fails, because it would generally be impossible 
to structure sharing in a way that preserves the incentive to invest in the first place. 
To save the element 2b as a conceptual matter, we could try to identify the “cost” of an 
invention, interpreted as the minimum reward required for efficient investment in the innovation. 
Then the cost could be amortized over time, with the users paying cost shares to the innovator.  
The problem is that it is famously difficult to calculate the efficient reward for an innovation.  
What evidence would be required? The number of competitors in the innovation process should 
enter into it, as well as the probability of success. What if the investment should not have been 
made at all, because otherwise a better alternative would have materialized? In that case, the 
optimal reward is arguably zero. In the vexed interface between competition policy and 
intellectual property policy, courts have never been willing to face the problem of calculating the 
optimal reward. Should we then propose that they solve this problem in the context of an 
essential facilities doctrine?  
One might also object that in providing for intellectual property protection, Congress has already 
made the judgment that sharing is not economically feasible. Sharing will generally erode the 
reward to the inventor.  The fundamental right granted by intellectual property law is the right to 
exclude users, and the justification for exclusivity is that it allows the owner earn a reward for his 
contribution.  
But this objection is unpersuasive. Under our interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine, the 
inventor would still receive her reward. In fact, structured sharing might be an improvement over 
the current situation where rewards have no relationship to costs. Because the price of a license 
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can be controlled by the structure of sharing, the doctrine could help bring the rewards into 
alignment with costs. The prices for using the intellectual property would be high enough to 
induce efficient investment, but no higher.  
We reiterate, though, that establishing the required reward is daunting and perhaps debilitating. 
Even the E.C. has not compelled sharing when the intellectual property is costly to develop. 
Where the EC has compelled sharing, namely, in Microsoft, IMS and Magill, they found that the 
cost of the intellectual property was zero, and therefore they did not face this problem. 
4. Rate regulation and compulsory sales in adjacent markets 
In Otter Tail, the rate-regulated transmission company threatened to cut off a municipality when 
the latter announced plans to distribute its own electricity, rather than contracting with Otter Tail 
to distribute it. Otter Tail had built a transmission grid knowing that they were subject to rate 
regulation. The only way that Otter Tail could make real profit was to distribute power locally 
for super-competitive rewards. However, when municipalities decided to terminate these 
contracts and distribute power themselves, Otter Tail threatened to cut them off from the 
transmission grid. This was deemed illegitimate. The Court did not have to address the problem 
of pricing, because transmission prices were regulated, but did require nondiscriminatory access. 
Otter Tail was not allowed to leverage its power over the essential facility, the transmission lines, 
into the adjacent market of electricity distribution.  
In MCI, the regulated firm was AT&T, which again owned the transmission lines (this time for 
long distance telecommunications) and local distribution (the local telephone exchanges). The 
case was about an entrant, MCI, that wanted to connect its own long distance lines to the local 
exchange. Again, there was no issue of efficient pricing, because AT&T’s local exchange prices 
were already regulated. As in Otter Tail, the court imposed an access requirement, which 
prevented AT&T from leveraging its power over the essential facility, local telephone 
exchanges, into the adjacent market of distance transmission. 
The apex of essential facilities cases in telecommunications is Trinko, where the Court refused to 
mandate sharing, on grounds that regulation already takes care of it. The case is different from 
MCI in that the Verizon was trying to protect the monopoly position of the essential facility 
itself, the local exchange, rather than trying to leverage into another market.  
Rate regulation changes the nature of the essential facilities inquiry, because rate regulation 
already recognizes the tension between efficient sharing and competitive pricing. The only news 
in these cases is that the regulated firm is not allowed to use an essential facility to capture an 
adjacent market. These cases stress the nondiscrimination issue in the requirement to share, 
rather than the pricing issue. 
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VI. Dangling Questions 
 
The cases that are commonly understood as comprising the essential facilities doctrine raise 
several additional issues.  
Q: In several of the cases, the Court relies on past sharing behavior to justify its order to share. 
How does this enter the calculus? 
Past sharing has been understood by courts as evidence of profitability, for example, in Aspen. 
However, past sharing should probably not be dispositive, as lawyers might then warn clients 
that sharing agreements are irreversible. In the long run, this could easily lead to less sharing 
than ever. In addition, sharing in the past does not necessarily prove that sharing is still sensible 
or feasible today. In Aspen it was recognized, at least tacitly, that defendants could rebut the 
argument of past sharing by pointing to other, more innocent changes that made past sharing 
arrangements obsolete.143  
Q: What is the role of open-access itself, as distinct from structured sharing that constrains 
pricing? 
We view open access or nondiscrimination as inherent in the essential facilities doctrine. Open 
access maximizes the beneficial synergies (until the facility becomes congested), while having 
the ancillary effect of preventing leverage into adjacent markets. The latter effect became 
particularly salient after MCI reinterpreted Terminal Railroad as a case about leveraging rather 
than a case about harvesting synergies.144  
Whatever one thinks about the harm from leveraging, it is not the original rationale for the 
essential facilities doctrine. The rationale is to harvest synergies. Moreover, the consumer harm 
from leveraging is disputed. Already in the 1970s, the so-called Chicago School pointed out that 
monopolists should earn the same profit with or without leveraging.145 Their critique can be seen 
in Commercial Solvents, where the wholesale monopolist of the essential input became a retail 
supplier, and was required to provide the input to a rival. Because the essential input can be 
provided at a monopoly price, there is little benefit to creating competition in the downstream 
                                                            
143 Defendant had, in fact, argued that it wanted to disassociate itself from plaintiff’s allegedly inferior 
skiing services. The jury rejected this argument. Id. at 610. 
 
144 Id. at 1132. See also p. 1144. (“Whether we label AT&T's violation of the antitrust laws as tying or the 
denial of an essential facility, our prime concern is that AT&T used its monopoly power in local 
telephone service as a lever to impede or destroy competition in other markets.”) 
 
145 For a sophisticated survey of the “one monopoly” objection and related counter-arguments, see. Mats 
A. Bergman “The role of the essential facilities doctrine” The Antitrust Bulletin/Summer (2001) 403 at 
421.  
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market for chemicals; there will still be monopoly pricing in that market due to the high price of 
the input, and the monopoly profit will mostly be collected by the monopolist supplier of the 
input. Nondiscriminatory access without a pricing constraint will not generally create the 
benefits of competitive pricing.146 
In Otter Tail, the consequence of open access was that a nonprofit distributor of electricity, the 
municipality, took the place of the Otter Tail in the local electricity market. This is the reason 
that open access helped consumers. If another for-profit distributor had taken the place of Otter 
Tail instead of the municipality, consumers would not have noticed a difference. It is only if 
open access supported competition in the municipal market, or a nonprofit provider like the 
municipality, that open access would have a beneficial effect. 
Similarly in MCI, if AT&T’s access prices to the local exchanges were not regulated, then open 
access would not lead to competitive pricing in long distance transmission. 
Q. Are the problems addressed by the essential facilities doctrine a subspecies of problems 
already addressed as Section 2 violations?  (For example, Professor Hovenkamp takes this view.)  
We agree that the refusal to share an essential facility can be labeled a species of refusal to deal. 
Our discussion illuminates a principle behind the unlawfulness of refusal, namely, that facilities 
should be shared when they provide synergies.  Other species of refusal to deal may be rooted in 
other principles. 
Q. Is the essential facilities doctrine likely to arise in Section 1 cases or Section 2 cases of the 
Sherman Act? 
The essential facilities doctrine has been invoked in both ways. Nothing in our analysis would 
contradict that. Terminal Railroad was decided under both sections. Section 1 is likely to be 
invoked when someone sues a cluster of firms that have made a contract to share a facility but to 
exclude rivals, as in Terminal Railroad or Associated Press. Section 2 is likely to be invoked 
when someone sues a single owner of a facility for access, as in Otter Tail and MCI. In both 
situations, the relevant aspects of the essential facilities doctrine are open access for rivals on 
terms that constrain the exercise of market power. The doctrine as we have reformulated it states 
when sharing should be required (a fortiori, when it should be allowed), and also sets the 
conditions of sharing that would constitute a defense to liability. If liability is found, the same 
conditions give guidance as to the remedy.  
                                                            
146 In fact, the requirement for sharing can be counterproductive, due to “double marginalization.” Even if 
there is a cost-minimizing reason to supply the market with two facilities, interpreted as two firms, the 
sale of the input at a price higher than marginal cost will distort the market. See Stephen M. Maurer and 
Suzanne Scotchmer, “Profit Neutrality in Licensing: The Boundary Between Antitrust Law and Patent 
Law.” 2007.  American Law and Economics Review 8:476-522.  
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Of course one would want to ensure that there is no conflict between the essential facilities 
doctrine and other principles of antitrust law. The standard for Section 1 liability is “rule of 
reason”147 which asks whether the alleged harm of the “contract in restraint of trade” outweighs 
the procompetitive benefits. That standard is built into the doctrine as we have formulated it 
above. As to Section 2 liability, Section 2 does not condemn every act that would harm 
competition under a “rule of reason” analysis. At the same time, any act that would be illegal 
under Section 2 would also satisfy Section 1’s governing principle, that if the act is condemned, 
it is because the act harms competition.148 The Trinko Court attributes the less inclusive approach 
of Section 2 to the ubiquity of unilateral acts. Too broad a rule would create too great a danger of 
“false positives.”149 
Another difference between Section 1 and Section 2 is in what it takes to trigger liability. Our 
analysis says nothing about whether a refusal to deal can trigger Section 2 liability without some 
additional act. This unresolved question only comes up under Section 2. Section 1 requires an 
agreement, and the agreement supplies the act. 
  
                                                            
147 First articulated in Standard Oil, supra. 
 
148Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) at  774. Professor Hovenkamp 
similarly acknowledges that the essential facilities doctrine must logically apply to both sections. Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (West 2011) at 336.(“Of 
course, once a properly defined ‘essential facility’ is at issue, it really should not matter whether the 
facility is controlled by a single firm or a group of firms acting in concert.”) 
 
149 Id. at  414. 
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Appendix: Cost Sharing 
In this section we evaluate the remedy of spinning off the shared facility and insisting that it be 
priced on cost-sharing terms. If the cost shares are fixed, then the cost sharing has no effect on 
prices, although it might chase small firms out of the market. To avoid this problem, the more 
reasonable cost sharing seems to be according to revenue shares or demand shares. We show that 
both schemes lead to higher prices in the market than fixed shares, and that demand-based cost 
sharing leads to even higher prices than revenue-based cost sharing. 
 
Index the firms i=1,2,..,n. Suppose the firms share the costs of a common facility, but set prices 
independently, that is, they compete on price.  If the shares are fixed, for example, each firm 
pays 1/n of the cost, then the cost shares will diminish their profit, but have no consequences for 
the prices they set, provided they remain in the market. The firm’s best marketing strategy would 
be the same regardless of how much money is taken off the top to pay for the facility. 
 
However, this will not be true if the cost shares depend on the firm’s success in the market. 
When the prices are (p1,p2,...,pn), let Di(p1,p2,...,pn) be the demand for firm i and let Ri(p1,p2,...,pn) 
be the revenue earned by firm i. 
 
Then the demand share and revenue share of firm i are respectively 
	
ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ
∑ ܦ௝ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ௡௝ୀଵ  
 
ܴ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ
∑ ௝ܴሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ௡௝ୀଵ ൌ
݌௜ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ
∑ ݌௝ܦ௝ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ௡௝ୀଵ  
 
When the (amortized) per-period cost of the facility is K, the profit of firm i is one of the 
following, depending on whether the cost share is determined according to demand or revenue: 
݌௜ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ െ ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ∑ ܦ௝ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ௡௝ୀଵ ܭ 
 
݌௜ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ െ ܴ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ∑ ௝ܴሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ௡௝ୀଵ ܭ 
If the cost term were replaced in either profit function with a fixed fraction K/n, then the 
most profitable choice of price, pi , would not depend on the cost or the cost share, except that the 
firm might be driven out of the market. The firm would choose price to maximize revenue, 
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ignoring the cost. It is because small firms might be driven out of the market that cost shares 
should be linked to revenues or demand.  
 
However, we now show that if the cost share depends on relative revenues or relative 
sales, the sharing will affect prices, and cause prices to be higher than with fixed shares.150 
Suppose, in particular, that an increase in firm i’s price would decrease the revenue, 
݌௜ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ. Then with fixed cost shares, the firm would not decrease the price; instead it 
would raise the price. However, if the costs are shared according to relative revenue, the decrease 
in revenue may also decrease the share of the cost that the firm pays, and will always do when 
total revenue (the denominator of the revenue share) decreases due to the decrease in price. This 
decrease in cost share might be enough so that the firm will lower the price.  
 
Demand-based cost sharing has the same effect. A decrease in price increases the sales of 
firm i at the expense of other vendors, thus increasing the demand-based cost share, and again 
diminishing the incentive to steal business by reducing price.  
 
Moreover, the dampening of price competition is more pronounced with demand-based 
cost sharing than with revenue-based cost sharing, at least when the firms are symmetric and 
charge the same price. To see this, suppose that there is an equilibrium with revenue-based cost 
sharing in which all firms charge a particular price p. There is no loss in normalizing the 
equilibrium price as p=1. Since we contemplate a change in firm i’s price, we will write the 
revenue share at these prices as  
 
ܴ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ
∑ ௝ܴሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ௡௝ୀଵ ൌ
݌௜ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ
݌௜ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ ൅ ∑ ܦ௝ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ,… , ݌௡ሻ௡௝ஷ௜  
 
If firm i reduces the price  ݌௜	to attract more market share, so that ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ 
increases, then the demand-based share ஽೔ሺ௣భ,௣మ,…,௣೙ሻ∑ ஽ೕሺ௣భ,௣మ,…,௣೙ሻ೙ೕసభ
 increases by more than the revenue-
based share ோ೔ሺ௣భ,௣మ,…,௣೙ሻ∑ ோೕሺ௣భ,௣మ,…,௣೙ሻ೙ೕసభ
, because ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ increases by more than 
݌௜ܦ௜ሺ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ሻ.  Since there is more effect on the share of cost that the firm must pay, it has 
even less incentive to compete by lowering price. 
  
 
                                                            
150 This follows Yooki Park and Suzanne Scotchmer, 2005, “Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital 
Products.” NBER working paper 11532.  
